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THE SEC'S VERSION OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET
THEORY AND ITS IMPACT ON
SECURITIES LAW LIABILITIES
MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ*
EDWARD B. HORAHAN III**
I. INTRODUCTION
The efficient market theory essentially posits that securities prices
reflect a significant amount of information from many different sources
in the securities market.' This proposition affects both the methods and
responsibilities of disclosure as mandated by the securities laws. To the
extent the efficient market theory is valid, disclosure methods may be
simplified because after information is translated into price, the investor
receives considerable information merely by knowing price information.2
Moreover, the element of.reliance in fraud actions may properly be read-
justed to allow a finding of reliance in situations involving the indirect
processing of material misstatements or omissions through inaccurate or
manipulated pricing of securities.3
* Partner, Arter Hadden & Hemmendinger, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1963, New York
University; LL.B 1966, Syracuse University; LL.M 1968, New York University.
** Associate, Arter Hadden & Hemmendinger, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1973, LaSalle
College; J.D. 1976, Yale Law School.
' See generally J. FRANCIS, INVESTMENTS ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 566-86 (2d ed.
1976). The efficient market theory exists in several manifestations which vary in their
assessment of how much and what type of information a security price incorporates. For ex-
ample, "[t]he semistrong efficient markets hypothesis requires that all available relevant
public information ... be fully reflected in security prices." Id. at 573. "The strongly effi-
cient markets hypothesis is that all (not just publicly available) information is fully reflected
in security prices." Id. at 579.
2 Some commentators have questioned the efficacy of disclosure mandated by the
securities laws in view of the efficient market hypothesis.
The rational average investor knows he cannot compete with ... experts. He does
not independently appraise information relating to security prices, but rather
relies more or less directly on experts to obtain and process such information for
him. Thus, the elaborate disclosure mechanism designed to protect-un-
sophisticated investors not only has conceptual flaws .. ., but also fails to operate
as intended because average investors do not make use of it in practice.
Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of
the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1070-71 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
' In a typical fraud action under the federal securities laws, a plaintiff must prove the
defendant's making of a material misrepresentation, accompanied by some degree of
scienter, upon which plaintiff reasonably relied to his detriment. See, e.g., Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 650 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982). The "fraud-on-the-market" theory of liability reduces
the element of reliance to a showing that a material misrepresentation has been made and
the plaintiff has purchased the security on the open market. The presumption of reliance
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The SEC's recent overhaul of the registration process4 and the
earlier acceptance by some courts of the "fraud-on-the-market" theory of
liability5 represent a partial incorporation of efficient market theory into
securities regulation. But the recognition that diffuse and rapid pro-
cesses supply information to the market requires that securities law
liabilities for potential defendants undergo a concomitant transforma-
tion. The incomplete adoption of efficient market principles exposes
underwriters, the research components of broker-dealers, and defen-
dants in securities fraud actions to liabilities and responsibilities
possibly inconsistent with their functions in the securities market.
This article will examine first the integrated disclosure system with
an emphasis on the SEC's failure to provide a practical program for
underwriters to follow in discharging their statutory duties. The article
will then analyze the potential for overcompensation of plaintiffs under
the "fraud-on-the-market" theory and examine the methods chosen by
the courts to limit damage awards to the compensation provided by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). Lastly, the article
will propose a reorientation of securities regulation which would recognize
the diminished capacity of underwriters to police the registration process
and would restrict recovery in lawsuits brought under the "fraud-on-the-
market" theory to those plaintiffs who actually sustained damages, in a
developed market, as a result of misrepresentations and omissions.
II. INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE
In general, the integrated disclosure system streamlines the
registration process under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act").
Three basic registration forms replace for most offerings the myriad of
customized forms used in the past. The integrated disclosure system
permits many issuers of new securities to rely on information they
previously have generated in the periodic reports required by the Ex-
change Act to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act.'
To engineer this change, the SEC, over time, enhanced the periodic
disclosures required of all companies to equalize the quality and quantity
of information required under the two Acts.' The beneficiaries of the ad-
garnered from the "fraud-on-the-market" theory has been utilized by several courts, see,
e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976), and ap-
plauded by commentators, see, e.g., Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Action
under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975).
' Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982).
' See generally Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Fraud-on-the-Market]. See also supra note 3.
' Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982).
' The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964)
made periodic disclosures more broadly applicable to issuers. The SEC had busily tinkered
with the specifics of disclosure for years. See, e.g., the rules, amended rules, and proposed
alterations in various rules to conform disclosure documents under the two Acts. Securities
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ditional disclosures are the companies entitled to incorporate these
disclosures by reference into their offering materials and the community
of investors who are provided with the free good of a reliable, coherent,
and substantial flow of historical data concerning the business and
operations of public companies! The feature of the efficient market
theory, borrowed to support the integrated disclosure system, is the
recognition that in developed markets issuer information provided
under the Exchange Act affects prices very quickly independent of the
prospectus required by the-Securities Act.'
But the SEC's acceptance of the efficient market theory has been
partial and grudging. This reaction is particularly evident in the Com-
mission's treatment of the liability concerns of underwriters. To under-
stand the scope of the SEC's apprehensions concerning the efficient
market theory, it is necessary to review the process and methodology
utilized by the Commission in its development of the integrated
disclosure system.
The SEC first adopted aspects of the efficient market theory in 1978
when the Commission expanded the availability of its short form
registration statement, the S-16, to issuers about which information is
widely disseminated among public investors." The form permitted incor-
poration by reference of existing reports filed under the Exchange Act
Act Release No. 6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (1980) (Form 10K and Regulation S-K); Securities
Act Release No. 6233, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,660 (1980) (Regulation S-X); Securities Act Release
No. 6234, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,682 (1980) (Uniform Instructions to Financial Statements);
Securities Act Release No. 6236, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,724 (1980) (Form 10-Q). See also earlier
Regulation S-K releases: Securities Act Release No. 5893, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,554 (1977);
Securities Act Release No. 5949, 43 Fed. Reg. 34,407 (1978).
' Commentators have long questioned the value to investors of historical data. See
Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293, 316
(1975) and articles cited therein. Indeed, given the impact of information on price called for
by the efficient market theory, the historical data itself generally should have a useful life
equal only to the time it takes for that information to be translated into price.
I Section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1976) provides: "It
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-.., to carry or cause to be carried
through the mails or in interstate commerce any ... security for the purpose of sale or for
delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus ... " Literally, the pro-
spectus delivery requirement does not contemplate delivery in time for the offeree's evalua-
tion of the information in the process of making an investment decision. Rule 15c2-8(b), 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8(b) (1982), does require delivery of a prospectus 48 hours before mailing of
a confirmation to a purchaser of an issuer's securities if the issuer has not been previously
subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Act.
10 Securities Act Release No. 5923, 43 Fed. Reg. 16,672 (1978). The concept and process
of integrating the disclosure requirements of the two Acts had been endorsed by blue-
ribbon advisory panels. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION FROM THE DISCLOSURE POLICY STUDY, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAP-
PRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE 1933 AND 1934 ACTS (1969) [hereinafter cited
as WHEAT REPORT]; ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited
as ADVISORY REPORT].
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as a substitute for redundant disclosure under the Securities Act. The
use of the form depended on the issuer's compliance with rigorous quality
standards."
Those submitting comments to the SEC on this proposal
represented diverse philosophical perspectives. Some argued that the
less comprehensive disclosures permitted under the Exchange Act were
poor substitutes for the thorough historical compilation required under
the Securities Act. Those same critics touted the beneficial effects of the
underwriter's review of an issuer's operations and financial standing in-
cluded in the registration process and worried over the possible elimina-
tion of this important safeguard. 2 The Commission's response played
down this concern:
The Securities Act liability for Exchange Act filings which
results from the incorporation by reference of the Exchange Act
documents into a registration statement on Form S-16 should
result in an improvement in the quality of disclosure in the Ex-
change Act filings. 3
" Subsequent to the tentative acceptance of the efficient market theory, the Commis-
sion confronted the practical problem of identifying the issuers of those securities most likely
to perform in the manner suggested by efficient market theory. The Commission wanted to
"assure that information about the issuer and the securities was available publicly and that
some type of market in the securities existed. Under these circumstances the offering price
of the new securities would likely be reasonable because the price could be established by
reference to the market price and the market price would be established by reasonably
well-informed investors in the open market." Securites Act Release No. 5879 [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) J 81,360, at 88,691 (1977).
The Commission had learned that financial analysts ordinarily followed issuers with
market capitalizations of $50 million or more. Id. at 88,692-93 n. 3. Accordingly, to assure a
substantial following among analysts, the Commission limited the availability of the in-
tegrated disclosure system to issuers who met the $50 million capitalization criterion.
12 Some critical respondents believed that under the integrated disclosure system
underwriters would not have the same access to an issuer's periodic reporting system that
they had enjoyed under the traditional registration process. Indeed, some commentators
noted that underwriters had avoided short form registration statements because of their
potential liability for incorporated Exchange Act reports. See Securities Act Release No.
5879, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,360, at 88,691 (1977). The
theme of inserting an agent to evaluate independently public disclosure is a recurrent one in
securities regulation. Congress placed underwriters and accountants in that position by sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
Accountants, in particular, are treated by the Commission as valued intermediaries
despite the professionally limited nature of their role and function. For example, in
evaluating potential eligibility requirements for determining those issuers who can use the
abbreviated disclosure of Form S-16, the Commission noted that commentators preferred a
disclosure requirement similar to the footnotes accompanying quarterly financial data in an-
nual reports over a requirement based exclusively on the size of capital assets. The primary
reason for this position was that a footnote requirement would ensure that accountants will
have reviewed the quarterly financial data of such issuers. Securities Act Release No. 5879,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,360, at 88,691 n.2 (1977).
13 Securities Act Release No. 5923, 43 Fed. Reg. 16,672, 16,673 (1978).
[Vol. 39:943
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The SEC always supposed that underwriters would still function as
guardians of the accuracy of disclosure regardless of the manner in
which information was provided to and utilized by the market.14
The SEC rejected suggestions by others submitting comments on
this proposal to loosen the eligibility criteria by eliminating a require-
ment that an issuer have $50 million in non-affiliate market capitaliza-
tion. They urged that requiring issuers to have been subject to the Ex-
change Act reporting requirements for three years, to have not
defaulted on any payment on debt or preferred stock for three years,
and to have had net income of $250,000 in three of the previous four
years sufficed to identify the issuers about which information was widely
and accurately reported. In rejecting the suggestion, the Commission
argued:
The $50 million market capitalization standard is adopted
because ... this requirement will provide some assurance that,
in addition to wide dissemination of information about such com-
panies in the market place, securities analysts will follow com-
panies of this size.... [P]rofessional interest should help assure
market reaction to material information about a company and
thereby alleviate the need to provide the information directly to
offerees when securities are registered on Form S-16 for a
primary offering. 5
Thus, the Commission demonstrated considerable uncertainty about the
efficacy of the efficient market theory. Moreover, as a further backup
system to efficient market processing of information, the Commission
has required that primary offerings be handled as firm commitment
underwritings and that incorporated documents be provided upon writ-
ten request and without charge to offerees. 6
Accordingly, the Commission, while committing itself to the efficient
market theory in form and for a strictly limited group of issuers, in
substance enlisted the aid of underwriters, financial analysts, and
issuers to assure that the efficient market theory comported with the
workings of securities markets. Underwriters, in view of their "due
diligence" liabilities, would police disclosure under both Acts and
enhance the quality of Exchange Act reports." When those submitting
comments to the SEC objected to the imposition of unfamiliar periodic
" Securities Act Release No. 5879, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,360, at 88,693 (1977).
15 43 Fed. Reg. at 16,673-74.
18 Id. at 16,674-77.
17 Securities Act Release No. 5879, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,360, at 88,693 (1977). Also, a firm commitment underwriting would assure an
orderly marketing of the shares as to number and price. Id.
1982]
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reporting responsibilities on underwriters, the Commission agreed to
consider rulemaking directed to the issue of an underwriter's liability
for Exchange Act reports.18
To assuage underwriters' concerns, the SEC initially tinkered with
the Securities Act format for underwriter liability. Section 11 of the
Securities Act19 permits persons involved in the registration process,
other than the issuer," to escape liability for material misstatements and
omissions in a registration statement if these persons have conducted a
reasonable investigation of the accuracy of the registration statement as
of its effective date.2 The Commission accepted, without discussion, the
premise that an underwriter is responsible, in some manner, for the ac-
curacy of materials incorporated by reference into a registration state-
ment without regard to the generation of the information outside of the
registration process.22 The SEC noted that Congress had established
specific liability provisions for underwriters in the Securities Act "in
recognition of their greater obligation to the public because of their im-
portance in the distributive process; their ability to obtain information
from the registrant; and the reliance placed on these persons by public
" The WHEAT REPORT, supra note 10, at 98-102, had recommended that underwriters
be freed, in substantial part, from due diligence responsibilities with respect to Exchange
Act reports incorporated by reference into registration statements for certain offerings.
The Commission acknowledged this suggestion, as well as the alternative suggestion of the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, ADVISORy REPORT, supra note 10, at 451-55,
that such incorporation by reference be taken into account in assessing the liability of
underwriters. The Commission, however, was not prepared at that time to accept either ap-
proach without further staff analysis. 43 Fed. Reg. at 16,674. Naturally, the SEC did not
question the regulatory need for an underwriter to mediate between an issuer's periodic
reports and public investors. The Exchange Act contemplates no such mediation. But the
ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 10, at 451-55, and, to a much less extent, the WHEAT REPORT,
supra note 10, at 98-102, accepted the premise that when an Exchange Act report intrudes
into the underwriter's bailiwick, the underwriter possesses some-albeit dimin-
ished- responsibility for such a report. This premise transfers the concept of expertization
from section 11 of the Securities Act to an Exchange Act report. But Exchange Act repor-
ting is produced by its own system of validation through its own liability rules and the value
of the additional validation concepts from the Securities Act is questionable.
'9 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
2 Section 77k(b) of Title 15 of the United States Code, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1976), specifical-
ly excludes issuers from the categories of persons involved in the registration process en-
titled to proffer a defense of "due diligence." Indeed, an issuer's responsibility with respect
to the accuracy of a prospectus may be denominated that of a guarantor. See Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 554, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
21 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976). With respect to portions of the prospectus prepared by
an expert, other persons involved in the registration process need not evaluate the expert's
findings. Rather, these persons simply must possess no reasonable ground to believe that
such expert's opinion contains a material misstatement or omission. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b}(3)(C)
(1976).




investors."' But the integrated disclosure system had undercut the
bases for such liability. Public investors were presumed not to be rely-
ing on disclosure in a prospectus and underwriters typically were not in-
cluded in issuers' periodic reporting programs. The Commission did ad-
mit, however, that practical problems confronted underwriters whose
section 11 liabilities might require them to become involved in an
issuer's Exchange Act disclosure process.
The SEC's provisional answer to these questions was to allow the ef-
fective date of incorporated disclosure documents to be the date of in-
itial filing and to treat superseding disclosure incorporated by reference
into the registration statement or appearing in the registration state-
ment as modifying prior disclosure without being deemed an admission
of liability under the federal securities laws.24 But the Commission's pro-
posal to treat the effective date of incorporated disclosure as the date of
its initial filing with the SEC offered less solace to underwriters than
the literal rule appeared to provide. The Commission simply refused to
free underwriters from a due diligence investigation.
The Commission believes that in order to establish a defense
-underwriters must review carefully the documents incorporated
by reference into registration statements on the Form S-16 to
assure that these documents, together with the prospectus, con-
tain no false and misleading information and that the facts
disclosed in these documents have not changed materially as of
the date of incorporation.'
Thus, an underwriter might still suffer Securities Act liability for an Ex-
change Act filing in the event that it was false when filed or subsequent
events made such a filing misleading. 6
The SEC, however, never adopted these proposals in the context of
short form registration. Rather, the Commission reissued the proposals
for comment when it started its comprehensive reorganization of the
Securities Act registration system." Still, the Commission did not accept
fully the terms of the efficient market theory. The Commission
acknowledged that the market analyzes information and translates it into
price, but nonetheless, the Commission required that the same informa-
tion, the usefulness of which had been exhausted, be incorporated by
reference into the prospectus for verification purposes. The SEC stated:
[E]ven though the registration statement is abbreviated, it
Id. at 81,058 n.6 (citation omitted).
24 Id. at 81,057.
Id. at 81,060.
Id. at 81,061.
Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980).
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should incorporate by reference the issuer's Exchange Act infor-
mation which otherwise would be included in the prospectus to
ensure that the information previously furnished is accurate in
all material respects.28
Thus, although investors would not find the information contained in
previously filed Exchange Act reports useful, the Commission maintained
the fiction of incorporation to tag underwriters and others with potential
liabilities under the Securities Act, without regard to the existing
liabilities under the Exchange Act for the very same information.29 The
Commission was quite definite in its insistence that underwriters remain
trapped in the registration system because "the presence of an under-
writer who has a degree of responsibility for an offering serves to
enhance the likelihood that investor protection will not suffer because of
abbreviated disclosure in the prospectus."3 But the Commission also
solicited comments on whether it should make abbreviated disclosure
available to qualified registrants regardless of the use of an underwriter
for the offering."
In its next incarnation, the SEC refined the eligibility requirements
for use of the integrated disclosure system to eliminate most of the
quality criteria previously used to identify the issuers eligible to use ab-
breviated registration statements.2 One of the retained criteria required
Id. at 63,698 (emphasis added).
',Section 7 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976), requires a registration state-
ment to contain the financial data detailed in Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976). Section 7
provides, however, "that the Commission may by rules or regulations provide that any such
information or document need not be included in respect of any class of issuers or securities
if it finds that the requirement of such information or document is inapplicable to such class
and that disclosure fully adequate for the protection of investors is otherwise required to be
included within the registration statement." 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976). Based on this language,
the SEC arguably has the statutory power to dispense with financial information in a
registration statement based on the dissemination of Exchange Act reports. Moreover, the
language that other material adequate for investors be included within the registration
statement suggests that incorporation by reference or financial data satisfied this statutory
mandate.
In creating the SEC, Congress believed, with respect to the Exchange Act at least, that
the agency had discretion to formulate disclosure requirements: "The Commission is given
complete discretion ... to require in corporate reports only such information as it deems
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or to protect investors." S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934).
" Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,700 (1980).
31 Id.
I Securities Act Release No. 6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902 (1981). The Commission stated
that it had "made a concerted effort to revise the eligibility requirements in a manner that
is simple and rational and is consistent with its intention to classify registrants on the basis
of the degree of information disseminated and analyzed in the marketplace." Id. at 41,905.
Although the Commission hoped to eliminate quality criteria, vestiges remained. For
example, a material default by an issuer since the filing of its last Exchange Act report con-
taining a certified financial statement made the issuer ineligible for the abbreviated
[Vol. 39:943
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an issuer to have filed Exchange Act reports for three years.3 The Com-
mission touted this requirement as "necessary because the operation of
an efficient market for a security depends on such information being
made public promptly and its inclusion in filings made under the Ex-
change Act helps ensure its accuracy."34 Thus, the SEC admitted that
the Exchange Act system possesses a value as a validator of information
provided to the market.
But the SEC still wanted to maintain Securities Act liabilities for
the Exchange Act reports incorporated by reference into the ab-
breviated registration statement. The Commission moved the listing of
the incorporated documents in the registration statement to that portion
which is required to be repeated in the prospectus to assure potential
liability for misstatements in both documents. 5 The SEC also questioned
the efficacy of information disseminated under the Exchange Act by re-
questing comments on "the need for a brief prospectus description of
subsequent material developments which are described in reports incor-
porated by reference."3
The Commission's equivocation on the vitality of the efficient
market theory evolved into a system retaining the theory, in part, for pur-
poses of the production of registration statements, but discarding it for the
purposes of the Securities Act liabilities. Thus, the proposal to accept
the effective date of an Exchange Act report as that of its initial filing
was interpreted out of existence. 7 The Commission continued to
recognize that the integrated disclosure system not only reduced the
time necessary to prepare registration statements, but also increased
the competitive pressures on underwriters under the system. 8 But these
added pressures in the SEC's view did not warrant a relaxation of the
registration statement. Id. at 41,906. Also, the requirement of "$150 million in aggregate
value of voting stock held by non-affiliates," although created to assure an avid following of
the issuer among investors and, in particular, among institutional investors, can be seen as a
preference for the larger companies. Oddly enough, the Commission's proposed "float"
criterion would identify nearly 1500 issuers as possible users of the abbreviated registration
statement. Id. at 41,909. The Commission's research, however, had shown that the research
arms of larger investment institutions followed only about 300-500 issuers. Id.
Id. at 41,905.
Id. at 41,905-06.
Id. at 41,914. Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), covers registra-
tion statement liabilities and section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976), covers prospectus
liabilities.
, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,915. Interestingly, the Commission had previously suggested a
minimum period of delay be maintained between filing and the effective date of the registra-
tion statement. Among the reasons for this suggestion was to enhance an underwriter's
ability to complete his due diligence investigation. The Commission decided to deal with
this question in terms of its authority to grant requests for acceleration of effective date. Id.
at 41,913.
Securities Act Release No. 6335, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,015 (1981).
Id. at 42,017. The Commission noted that commentators had asserted that by accepting
incorporation by reference of Exchange Act disclosures, the Commission sacrified the
1982]
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liability standards applicable to underwriters. "The Commission's ef-
forts towards integration of the Securities Act and Exchange Act relate
solely to elimination of unnecessary repetition of disclosure, not to the
requirements of due diligence which must accompany any offering." 9
Due diligence, however, which requires independent verification of most
matters presented in the registration statement, is little more than a
repetition of the steps taken to formulate the information initially."
Thus, even though the Commission had previously recognized that the
Exchange Act reporting system served, in some way, to ensure the ac-
curacy of disclosure, the Commission still was willing to impose a
repetitive validation system through the imposition of Securities Act
liabilities. 1 The Commission reasoned that no unfair burden was imposed
on an underwriter because "the underwriter is never compelled to pro-
ceed with an offering until he has accomplished his due diligence" and
the integrated disclosure system did not preclude corrective disclosure
by way of an additional Exchange Act report incorporated by reference
or by correction in the registration statement. 2 But in view of the speed
with which an abbreviated registration statement can be produced, the
concomitant price pressures on investment bankers, the fact that the in-
corporated documents have been validated by the Exchange Act system
of liabilities, and the fact that the issuer stands as guarantor of the ac-
curacy of materials contained in the registration statement, little is gained
in the way of investor protection, under the SEC's new system, by re-
quiring an additional independent verification by underwriters."
The Commission was careful to point out that, because of the com-
pressed timetable for registration statement preparation in the in-
tegrated disclosure system, underwriters could practically discharge
"crucible" for adequate disclosure provided by the independent drafting of the prospectus
without also relaxing the liability rules pertinent to such a process. Id. at 41,019.
Id. at 42,020.
40 Representations by management, in essence, should be verified by testing those
representations against the written record. See, e.g., Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp.,
283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
" The Commission declared:
The integrated disclosure system, past and proposed, is thus not designed to
modify the responsibility of underwriters and others to make a reasonable in-
vestigation. Information presented in the registration statement, whether or not
incorporated by reference, must be true and complete in all material respects and
verified where appropriate. Likewise, nothing in the Commission's integrated
disclosure system precludes conducting adequate due diligence.
Securities Act Release No. 6335, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,015, 42,020 (1981) (emphasis added).
42 Id.
4" Yet redundant verification is precisely what the SEC contemplated.
The Commission specifically rejects the suggestion that the underwriter needs only
to read the incorporated materials and discuss them with representatives of the
registrant and named experts. Because the registrant would be the sole source of
virtually all information, this approach would not, in and of itself, include the ele-
ment of verification required by the case law and contemplated by the statute.
[Vol. 39:943
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their due diligence functions by either: 1) a delay in filing of the registra-
tion statement until a due diligence investigation can be conducted; or 2)
the development "in advance [of] a reservoir of knowledge about the
companies that may select the underwriter to distribute their securities
registered on short form registration statements."" Since the chief ad-
vantage of abbreviated registration statements is speed, the latter alter-
native is the only meaningful possibility. The Commission also suggested
that "the need for elaborate original investigations by underwriters"
could be minimized by inserting the underwriter and its counsel into the
preparation process for the issuer's annual report on Form 10-K." The
Commission did not offer any reason for an underwriter (or prospective
underwriter) to subject itself to potential Exchange Act liabilities for
participating in the preparation of a prospective client's Form 10-K; nor
did it identify the persons (presumably the investing public) who would
bear the costs for these additional activities.
To mitigate against some of tle dangers confronting underwriters,
the SEC proposed a rule delineating the permissible factors affecting
the variability of a due diligence investigation.46 But the Commission
eliminated the potential protections the rule afforded by setting the ef-
fective date on an incorporated disclosure document as the date of its in-
itial filing with the SEC.
The declaration that the effective date of a prior filing is its initial
filing date does not mean that it must be evaluated for purposes
of Section 11(a) as of that date or that if there is an error in that
filing a liability will attach under the Securities Act based solely
on the contents of the document at the time of its initial filing.
Rather, inaccurate or out-dated information in a prior filing
should not be deemed to make the prospectus false or misleading
if updating or correcting information is included in a later filing
or in the registration statement.
4 7
" Id. The Commission indicated that the advance accumulation of information about
issuers would only facilitate the due diligence investigation and not replace it. Id. at 42,021.
'Id.
" Id. at 42,021-22. The SEC based the proposal governing due diligence investigations
on section 1704(g) of the ALI's Federal Securities Code, ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE § 1704(g)
(1980). The proposal included factors such as the type of issuer and security, and the nature
of the person's relationship with the issuer and to the documents incorporated by reference.
Because the Commission had also recommended that underwriters be involved in the Ex-
change Act reporting system, it eviscerated the possible benefit accruing to underwriters
under this rule when the underwriters had no responsibilities for an issuer's Exchange Act
reporting system.
Interestingly enough, the Commission, in proposing rules for Form S-16 registration
statements, did not include a rule setting forth the variables affecting the reasonableness of
a due diligence investigation. The Commission noted that such a rule was unnecessary in
view of existing judicial constructions recognizing that such an investigation would vary
with the individual circumstances of the offering. Securities Act Release No. 5998, [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,761, at 81,060 (1978).
"' Securities Act Release No. 6335, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,015, 42,023 (1981).
19821
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
Thus, regardless of the paucity of time available to underwriters to con-
duct due diligence investigations and the minimal opportunities for
underwriters to participate meaningfully in the development of Ex-
change Act disclosure documents, the Commission determined that in-
vestors could, and should, rely on underwriters to perform an in-
vestigatory function.48
The Commission's final rulemaking on the integrated disclosure
system adopted the abbreviated registration statement for widely
followed issuers substantially as proposed.49 If anything, the SEC expanded
the availability of the short-form S-3 to include secondary offerings and
offerings of preferred stock regardless of the amount of outstanding
voting stock in the hands of non-affiliates." Also, the Commissioi
recognized that information contained in virtually any report filed with
the SEC affects a developed market and is, therefore, eligible for incor-
poration by reference instead of repeating the disclosure in the registra-
tion statement.5 1
Therefore, the Commission has largely accepted the efficient market
theory for the strata of issuers the Commission believes are most likely
to have securities that behave in the manner suggested by the theory.
Yet the Commission has not altered the requirement that underwriters
for those issuers must verify the accuracy of the information that has
already been incorporated into the prices for the securities of those
issuers. The putative salve for those subject to the duty to perform due
diligence is a rule detailing some of the factors which might necessitate a
greater or lesser obligation to investigate 52 and a rule related to the
's Id. The militance of the SEC in the cause of retaining the due diligence requirement
cannot be gainsaid. The Commission quoted, with approval, the following language from
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973):
No greater reliance in our self-regulatory system is placed on any single partici-
pant in the issuance of securities than upon the underwriter .... Prospective in-
vestors look to the underwriter ... to pass on the soundness of the security and
the correctness of the registration statement and prospectus.
46 Fed. Reg. at 42,023 n. 73. Indeed, the Commission also solicited comments on whether to
require managing underwriters to represent that adequate time had existed for conducting
a due diligence investigation in connection with the underwriter's request to accelerate the
effective date of the registration statement. Id. at 42,023. This proposal did not become a
part of the Commission's final rulemaking on integrated disclosure. Securities Act Release
No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,399 (1982).
47 Fed. Reg. at 11,380.
o Id. at 11,384.
Id. at 11,385. The primary example of an incorporated disclosure document is the
proxy statement.
'2 Rule 176, 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1982), provides:
In determining whether or not the conduct of a person constitutes a
reasonable investigation or a reasonable ground for belief meeting the standard
set forth in section 11(c), relevant circumstances include, with respect to a person
other than the issuer.
(a) The type of issuer;
(b) The type of security;
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methodology and effect of modifying or superseding disclosure made in
filings incorporated by reference into the registration statement. 3 The
Commission went so far as to grant that "the availability of information
with respect to the registrant" might affect the content of a due
diligence investigation.54 But the Commission noted that this allowance
concerned information within the control of third persons and did not
relate to information within the control of the issuer.
5
Consequently, an integrated disclosure system is in place with
equivalent disclosures required under both the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act. Indeed, for issuers in a developed market with a wide
following among professional investors, the Securities Act disclosure
merely includes the Exchange Act disclosure in deference to the effi-
cient market theory. Those Exchange Act disclosures, produced under
(c) The type of person;
(d) The office held when the person is an officer;
(e) The presence or absence of another relationship to the issuer when the
person is a director or proposed director;
(f) Reasonable reliance on officers, employees, and others whose duties
should have given them knowledge of the particular facts (in the light of the
functions and responsibilities of the particular person with respect to the
issuer and the filing);
(g) When the person is an underwriter, the type of underwriting arrange-
ment, the role of the particular person as an underwriter and the availability
of information with respect to the registration; and
(h) Whether, with respect to a fact or document incorporated by reference,
the particular person had any responsibility for the fact or document at the
time of the filing from which it was incorporated.
Rule 412, 17 C.F.R. § 230.412 (1982) provides:
(a) Any statement contained in a document incorporated or deemed to be in-
corporated by reference shall be deemed to be modified or superseded for pur-
poses of the registration statement or the prospectus to the extent that a state-
ment contained in the prospectus or in any other subsequently filed document
which also is or is deemed to be incorporated by reference modifies or replaces
such statement.
(b) The modifying or superseding statement may, but need not, state that it
has modified or superseded a prior statement or include any other information set
forth in the document which is not so modified or superseded. The making of a
modifying or superseding statement shall not be deemed an admission that the
modified or superseded statement, when made, constituted an untrue statement
of a material fact, an omission to state a material fact necessary to make a state-
ment not misleading, or the employment of a manipulative, deceptive, or
fraudulent device, contrivance, scheme, transaction, act, practice, course of
business or artifice to defraud, as those terms are used in the Act, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, or the rules and regulations thereunder.
(c) Any statement so modified shall not be deemed in its unmodified form to
constitute part of the registration statement or prospectus for purpose of the Act.
Any statement so superseded shall not be deemed to constitute a part of the
registration statement or the prospectus for purposes of the Act.
" Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,399 (1982).
55 Id.
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threat of liability for misrepresentations or omissions, possess a certain
degree of reliability which is backed by the reporting company, and,
often, by their professional advisors who comment on or assist in prepar-
ing the reports. When those same reports are utilized in the context of a
registration statement, the issuer stands as guarantor of their accuracy.
To add an underwriter's independent investigation to the safeguards
peculiarly present in the Securities Act may be seen as unfairly favoring
the purchasers of new offerings over ordinary traders. There is no ap-
parent reason to prefer the one class over the other. Indeed, since the
majority of trades are conducted in the aftermarket for securities, it
would seem that the greater danger to investors arises in that
market-particularly when one restricts the additional safeguard of an
underwriter's due diligence investigation with respect to Exchange Act
reports to the group of issuers eligible to utilize an abbreviated registra-
tion statement. The argument that traders in the aftermarket would
benefit from any new information revealed in an underwriter's in-
vestigation can be dismissed since such an investigation would only oc-
cur under the fortuitous circumstance of a new securities offering. Other
issuers abound and investors in their securities are no less worthy.
Further, to the extent that the integrated disclosure system enables
issuers to react quickly to market conditions by preparing and floating a
new issue of securities, the requirement of a largely redundant due
diligence investigation by underwriters serves to impede capital forma-
tion without a demonstrable boost to the goal of investor protection. If
the corporate management of an issuer in the class qualified to use the
abbreviated registration statement can confound the corporation's board
of directors, accountants, and lawyers with respect to disclosure, cor-
porate management can similarly dupe the underwriter with or without
a due diligence investigation. Accordingly, the retention for under-
writers of due diligence responsibilities in the context of short form
registration statements is not useful.
III. "FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET" LIABILITY THEORY
The "fraud-on-the-market" theory of liability permits plaintiffs to
prove reliance indirectly by proving a purchase or sale of a security
subsequent to a material misrepresentation by the defendant. Under the
theory, the plaintiff need not prove actual reliance on, or even
knowledge of, the misrepresentation.," This liability theory is grounded
on the basic principle of the efficient market theory that the securities
market translates information about the issuer into the market price for
the issuer's securities. 7 Thus, according to the theory, an investor relies
on the data about an issuer, including misrepresentations, that the
See generally Fraud-on-the-Market, supra note 5. See also Blackie v. Barrack, 524
F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
" See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975); In re LTV Securities
Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 142-44 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
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market has translated into the market price in the same manner in
which the investor would rely on direct representations or misrepresen-
tations concerning a security."
Commentators have urged that the SEC should restrict the "fraud-
on-the-market" theory to -securities for which there is a developed
market.59 In establishing the criteria for determining which issuers are
eligible to use the abbreviated registration statement on form S-3, the
SEC has attempted to identify the issuers followed closely by the
market and market professionals. 0 Accordingly, to the extent the courts
decide to restrict the "fraud-on-the-market" theory to stocks likely to
behave in the manner suggested by the efficient market theory, the SEC
has provided the judiciary with a useful means to identify those
securities. But the courts will also have to develop a coherent means to
recognize defenses made pertinent by the efficient market theory.
The classic application of the "fraud-on-the-market" theory occurred
in Blackie v. Barrack.1 In Blackie, the plaintiff class alleged
misrepresentations and omissions over a 27 month period in a series of
SEC filings and press releases which served to inflate the market price
of the securities.2 The court determined that "proof of subjective
reliance on particular misrepresentations is unnecessary to establish a
10b-5 claim for a deception inflating the price of stock traded in the open
market.... We think causation is adequately established in the imper-
sonal stock exchange context by proof of purchase and the materiality of
misrepresentations, without direct proof of reliance." 3 The court shifted
the burden of proof on this element of causation to defendants by permit-
ting them to disprove "transactional causation."64
1 In a way, an investor's reliance on the validity of the market price is more convinc-
ing than reliance on a face-to-face representation, since the market price involves a collec-
tive evaluation of the impact of data and a direct representation may simply relate to an
atomistic assessment peculiar to a particular investor.
61 Fraud-on-the-Market, supra note 5, at 1156-58.
17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (1982). Briefly, the issuer must be a U.S. corporation with
registered securities and must be subject to the Exchange Act reporting system for three
years. The issuer may not be in default on any debt repayment since the end of the last
fiscal year for which a certified financial statement has been filed with the SEC. The issuer
must also have either $150 million in aggregate market value of voting securities held by
non-affiliates or $100 million in aggregate market value of voting stock held by non-affiliates
and annual trading volume in that stock of 3 million or more shares. Id.
61 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
Id. at 902.
Id. at 906 (citations omitted).
Id. In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), the court defined the term "transaction causation" to mean
"that the violations in question caused the appellant to engage in the transaction in ques-
tion." Although this definition appears to imply that the violation must have induced the
transaction, the court's treatment of the issue suggested that the violation need only accom-
pany the transaction. "In a misrepresentation case, to show transaction causation a plaintiff
must demonstrate that he relied on the misrepresentations in question when he entered in-
to the transaction which caused him harm." Id. (citation omitted, emphasis added).
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Defendants may do so in at least 2 ways: 1) by disproving
materiality or by proving that, despite materiality, an insuffi-
cient number of traders relied to inflate the price; 2) by proving
that an individual plaintiff purchased despite knowledge of the
falsity of a representation, or that he would have, had he known
of it.,,
The court conceded that the ability to disprove causation would not
greatly assist potential defendants since it was unlikely that "a defen-
dant would be able to prove in many instances to a jury's satisfaction
that a plaintiff was indifferent to a material fraud."6 The court also
recognized that the reliance of the market participant in entering the
transaction would not be on the specific misrepresentation or omission
charged. Rather, the market participant may have determined to enter
the transaction for reasons unrelated to or regardless of the
misrepresentation.
Nevertheless, [the market participant] relies generally on the
supposition that the market price is validly set and that no un-
suspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and
thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying
the stock price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price he
pays reflects material misrepresentations. 7
Thus, the court accepted that the pricing accuracy of the market is an
assurance to investors that the price they pay incorporates such infor-
mation as the federal securities laws require the issuer to disclose. 8
The defenses outlined by the court in Blackie suggest possible
limitations on a "fraud-on-the-market" case. But those limitations are not
meaningful. The court's disjunctive proffer that a defendant could
escape liability either by disproving the materiality of the misrepresen-
tations or by proving that, despite materiality, the misrepresentations
did not affect the price of the security can be viewed as a single test for
the purposes of "fraud-on-the-market" liability. Indeed, there is no dif-
ference between the tests because if the misrepresentation did not alter
the market price, no compensable injury has occurred to an investor
nominally relying on the accuracy of the market price.
If, however, the Blackie court was correct in distinguishing between
material facts 9 and facts affecting the market price for a security, it
524 F.2d at 906.
Id. at 906-07 n. 22.
67 Id. at 907. The Blackie decision did not discuss whether fraud-on-the-market should
be brought under § 9 rather than § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See Chemetron Corp. v.
Business Funds, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,777 (5th Cir. 1982).
" The Blackie court did not rule on the appropriate damage measure in a "fraud-on-
the-market" action, but did suggest that rescission might be an appropriate measure. 524
F.2d at 909.
69 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
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would still be reasonable to apply the materiality test only to the facts
that would alter the market price for the security. In this connection, the
SEC's recognition that market professionals process the information
which affects market price, as well as the SEC's view that the efficient
market theory applies to those issuers closely followed by market pro-
fessionals, might suggest that materiality in such cases could be
measured by the standards of the professional investor rather than the
reasonable investor.
The Blackie court also indicated that a defendant could defeat the
"fraud-on-the-market" theory's presumption of reliance by proof either
that an individual plaintiff purchased with knowledge of the
misrepresentation or that he would have purchased anyway had he
known of the misrepresentation."0 Both aspects of this defense appear to
miss the implication of the efficient market theory. If the "fraud-on-the-
market" theory has been formulated to obviate the deleterious effects of
mispricing of securities by the market, it would seem that an injured
plaintiff's awareness of a misrepresentation would not remedy the
mispricing or provide the injured plaintiff with the means to correct the
mispricing unless the plaintiff acted to supply the information to the
market. Further, the court's suggestion that a defendant prove that a
plaintiff would have purchased anyway had he known of the
misrepresentation appears to miss the point. An individual plaintiffs im-
munity to a particular misrepresentation provides no assurance that the
market possesses a similar immunity. Also, such a plaintiff would pur-
chase the security without the market's valuation of the information as
to which the plaintiff is indifferent. Presumably, then, such a plaintiff
would have purchased at a higher price than what the market would
have set for the same security if the same information had been provided
to the market. Even though the investor had been granted the oppor-
tunity to evaluate the misrepresentation himself, he would have
foregone the opportunity to receive the input of other investors through
the pricing mechanism of the market.
Nevertheless, the compensation theme" of the federal securities law
dictates that a plaintiff with knowledge of a misrepresentation or omis-
sion will not recover for the known risk of an inaccurately priced security.
For example, a court has held that a securities purchaser seeking to ac-
quire the issuer cannot recover for alleged misrepresentations and omis-
sions the issuer's management made while attempting to ward off the
takeover.72 Under these circumstances, the plaintiff knowingly paid the
inflated price of the security. 3 The plaintiff could not demonstrate a con-
nection between his loss and the misrepresentation or omission because,
524 F.2d at 906.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(c), 78q(a) (1976).
72 Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98, 750, at 93,774 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
73Id.
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in a sense, he provoked the misrepresentations. This sort of conduct is
segregated from actionable conduct by the application of the causation
principle of reliance. It has been stated: "[a]bsent the requirement of
causation, Rule 10b-5 would become an insurance plan for the cost of
every security purchased in reliance upon a material misstatement or
omission." 4
The application of causation priciples would deny recovery to an in-
dividual plaintiff who, for whatever reason, misinterpreted the signif-
icance of a known misrepresentation or would have misinterpreted it.75
Because the market price of a security presumptively represents an
equilibrium position in the interaction between buyers and sellers, it
presupposes different interpretations of information by the varied par-
ticipants in the process. In Blackie, the court did not believe that, as a
practical matter, a defendant could separate out those plaintiffs indif-
ferent to the alleged misrepresentations." It seems, however, that the
identification of such plaintiffs would simply demonstrate the obvious
existence of an array of market participants with different reactions to
the same information or misinformation. Compensating individual in-
vestors who are indifferent to, or would misinterpret the significance of,
certain facts violates the principle of restricting recoveries to those suf-
fering injury as a result of the misrepresentation or omission of those
facts. But this is precisely the bias of the "fraud-on-the-market" theory.
The use of the "reasonable investor" standard, in this context, to
limit recoveries to the compensatory goals of the securities laws again
appears overbroad. If the SEC is correct that an indicator of the ex-
istence of an efficient market in a security is the presence of a wide
following by market professionals (assuring that information has an ap-
propriate market impact), then the reaction of those market profes-
sionals could represent a more appropriate measure of the sorts of misin-
formation which would have a market impact and are, therefore, capable
of redress through the "fraud-on-the-market" theory.77 Adoption of the
" Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 650
F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982).
7' By "misinterpret," in this context, we mean that the individual investor's reaction
deviates significantly from the aggregate equilibrium market reaction.
7' 524 F.2d at 906-07 n. 22.
" The difference between the reasonable investor and professional investor standards
can be illustrated by reference to Greenapple v. Detroit Edison Co., 618 F.2d 198 (2d Cir.
1980). The majority found the prospectus presentation of a complex and specialized accounting
concept imperfect, but not misleading. Id. at 211. Chief Judge Kaufman, in dissent, argued:
It may well be, as the majority implies, that utility specialists and expert accoun-
tants were well aware of the non-cash nature of the AFDC [the accounting concept
in question]. It may even be presumed that the success or failure of Detroit
Edison's offering would rest largely upon these experts' careful analyses of the
prospectus, and not the untutored scrutiny of the appellant or other hapless in-
vestors. But I fail to see how any of this bears on the issue before us, namely,
whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would con-
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"professional investor" standard would serve to reduce overcompensa-
tion for misrepresentations unlikely to have substantial market impact.
In Panzirer v. Wolf,78 the Second Circuit wrestled with the issue of a
plaintiff claiming under the "fraud-on-the-market" theory but eschewing
reliance on the price set by the market. The plaintiff there claimed that
she based her stock purchase on an article in the Wall Street Journal
reporting that analysts believed that the issuer was "in a good position
to take advantage of the growing demand for videotapes" and
represented "'an attractive turn-around situation.' , The issuer had
sent an annual report to shareholders weeks before and the plaintiff
alleged that the report contained material misrepresentations. In what
the court denominated the "chain of causation," plaintiff alleged that if
the annual report had been accurate, the analysts would not have cited
the issuer, the Wall Street Journal would not have printed the article,
and the plaintiff would not have purchased the stock." The court held:
Where the plaintiff acts upon information from those working in
or reporting on the securities markets, and where that informa-
tion is circulated after a material misrepresentation or omission,
plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim of reliance on the
misrepresentation or omission.'
In so holding, the court eviscerated the statement in Blackie that a
defendant could escape liability by proving that the plaintiff would not
have acted differently given correct information about the issuer.2 In-
deed, the court believed it likely "that a lower price accurately reflecting
[the issuer's] true financial position might have led her to buy more
stock." 3
The court explained its denial of this defense as follows:
Our holding is no more than an extension of Blackie. Zelda Pan-
zirer did not rely on the integrity of the market price because
she did not rely on price, but she did rely on the integrity of the
market in producing the information reported in the Wall Street
Journal. 4
sider the non-cash nature of AFDC income important in reaching an investment
decision.
Id. at 215. In the context of the "fraud-on-the-market" theory, courts would use the reac-
tions of market professionals rather than reliance by the investor as the benchmark to
establish those misrepresentations which, because of their likely impact on market prices,
can be treated as material misrepresentations.
76 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), pet. for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3998 (U.S. June 28, 1982).
7' Id. at 366.
Id. at 367.
8Id.
See text accompanying notes 61-68 supra.
663 F.2d at 367 n. 3.
Id. at 368.
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The court need not have gone so far. The plaintiff very likely purchased
an inaccurately priced security. 5 The fact that the plaintiff in Panzirer
was not price sensitive does not alter this inaccuracy. Accordingly, she
paid a price for the security in excess of what the market would have
otherwise demanded of her. If recoveries under securities laws were not
limited to compensation attributable to violations of those laws, the
plaintiff's compensable interest would be equal to the market impact of
the misrepresentation under either the Second Circuit's market integri-
ty rationale or an alternative thesis that "fraud-on-the-market" theory
need not deny recovery to investors who would have purchased even
given accurate information. A possible method for determining the ex-
tent of damages under either theory is to measure the market impact of
a misrepresentation in terms of the effect such misrepresentation had on
a market professional.
The "professional investor" standard would allow investors to
recover who would not have reacted differently to a correct pricing
signal by the market. Significantly, this method fails to distinguish those
investors who provoked the incorrect pricing from other kinds of in-
vestors." Assuming investors who provoke incorrect pricing should be
without a remedy, some means of distinguishing these investors from
other kinds of investors is necessary. One possible solution is to evaluate
the investor's expectation interest in the accuracy of the market price.
This analysis may be appropriately undertaken in connection with an
assessment of "loss causation."88 As one court put it: "Causation requires
one further step in the analysis: even if the investor would not otherwise
have acted, was the misrepresented fact a proximate cause of the loss."88
All investors acting through the market purchase or sell at the price set
by the market. Investors who have misinterpreted the potential market
" Whether the plaintiff in Panzirer purchased an inaccurately priced security is not
altogether clear. The stock price reacted only slightly in the period between issuance of the
annual report and the announcement of the issuer's entry into the video cassette market. Id.
at 367 n. 2.
" Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.) (en banc),pet. for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3377
(U.S. Nov. 2, 1981), is not included in this analysis because it has no direct kinship with cases
like Blackie or Panzirer. Although Shores uses "fraud-on-the-market" terminology, in
substance, Shores substitutes an implied warranty of merchantability for the requirement
of reliance when purchasers in a new offering do not read the prospectus. The Shores court
stated that damages would be limited to instances in which the issuer could not bring a
security into the market at all without committing fraud. Id. at 470.
' By reference to Oklahoma Publishing Co., supra note 72, an investor seeking to ac-
quire an issuer that tries to fend off the attempt by making material misrepresentations can
be viewed as having provoked the misrepresentations or, at least, knowingly to have incur-
red the risk of purchasing mispriced securities as a result of misleading defensive tactics.
' Assessment of loss causation involves a showing "that the misrepresentations or
omissions caused the economic harm .... Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374,
380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
" Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omit-




impact of information will have traded at an erroneous price but may be
seen as having accepted the risk that their interpretive skills are dif-
ferent from those of other market participants. An investor pursuing a
takeover target, regardless of price, might be seen as suffering a loss
based on his own failed acquisition attempt rather than the mispricing of
the security caused by misrepresentations. If the aim is to compensate
those who have paid, contrary to their expectation, an erroneous price
for a security, the purchase of a security, for reasons other than the
price, may require no compensation.
IV. A SUGGESTED REORIENTATION FOR SECURITIES LAW LIABILITIES
Currently, investment bankers are contesting certain applications of
the integrated disclosure system. Underwriters are urging the SEC to
delay or deny the short-form registration process so that underwriters
can conduct their due diligence investigations. The underwriters are
correct in pointing out that the SEC cannot practically maintain a
system which allows prompt access to the capital markets, based on the
observation that the securities markets reflect available data about the
issuer, but insists nonetheless that underwriters conduct a due diligence
investigation to validate information which has previously affected the
market. The underwriters are willing to accept the latter duty in ex-
change for a delay in the registration process." But it is not clear that
this would be a fair tradeoff. As noted above, a due diligence investiga-
tion by underwriters does not significantly add to the goal of investor
protection in view of the more extensive liabilities of issuers.2
Moreover, to the extent such an investigation possesses value, it
distinguishes purchasers of new offerings from traders in the after-
market for no reason other than the separate development of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. To further integrate the opera-
tions of the two Acts and to provide investors in new offerings and the
aftermarket with roughly equivalent protections, the SEC should
dispense with the due diligence investigation by underwriters in favor of
the prompt access to the capital markets allowed by the short-form
registration process for the issuers attracting a wide following in the
market.
There is Commission precedent to sustain such a position. The SEC
had, over the years, explored the possibility of allowing registrants to
utilize the ratings assigned to debt issues by certain organizations in
their registration statements. A possible bar to the use of these ratings
See Ehrbar, Upheaval in Investment Banking, FORTUNE, Aug. 23, 1982, at 90-92.
Commissioner Thomas has suggested roll-back of the integrated disclosure to allow under-
writer's an opportunity to discharge their due diligence responsibilities. Securities Act
Release No. 6423, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,250, at 85,279-90 (1982).
9 Id. at 92.
" See pp. 951-56 supra.
13 See Securities Act Release No. 6336, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,024 (1981).
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would be the refusal by the debt rating organizations to consent to the
use of their ratings in a registration statement because of the potential
liability accruing thereby under the Securities Act." To avoid this hur-
dle, the Commission eliminated potential Securities Act liabilities for
these organizations. 5 In so doing, the Commission conceded that the
ratings would be relied on by market participants regardless of the
technical inclusion of the ratings in a registration statement and that ex-
isting liabilities under the Exchange Act protected investors for the
fraudulent development of such ratings. 8
A similar exemption has been granted accountants in connection
with their limited review of interim, unaudited financial reports. 7 The
Commission recognized that such information would be valuable to in-
vestors even though not produced pursuant to an audit, the customary
indicator of professionally prescribed due diligence by accountants. The
Commission, therefore, removed the potential liability of accountants for
such statements under section 11 of the Securities Act on the grounds
that the accountants' antifraud liabilities and the due diligence obliga-
tions of other persons were sufficient means to protect investors. 8
Similarly, underwriters should be freed from their due diligence
obligations with respect to short-form registration statements. The
recognition that the developed market incorporates information
available under the Exchange Act and thus eliminates the necessity for
its repetition in a registration statement allows issuers prompt and
relatively less expensive access to the markets. There is no sound reason
to forego these benefits to enable underwriters to conduct due diligence
investigations on information produced under the threat of Exchange
Act liabilities and further backed by the issuer's guarantee of accuracy
under the Securities Act.
The Commission's suggestion that underwriters can accelerate their
due diligence investigation by becoming involved in issuers' Exchange
Act reporting programs creates for underwriters the further risk of
possible Exchange Act liabilities. Recently, the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia suggested that securities professionals at
some point owe a duty to the public to share their analyses.9 The case
arose from the activities of a market professional who uncovered the
9, Id. at 42,027.
9 See Rules 134(a)(14) and 436(g), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134(a)(14), 230.436(g) (1982). See also
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(d) (1982).
" 46 Fed. Reg. at 42,021-28. The Commission cited as examples of the potential an-
tifraud liabilities the cases Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 420 F.
Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) and University Hill Foundation v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F.
Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 46 Fed. Reg. at 42,028.
' See Securities Act Release No. 6173,45 Fed. Reg. 1601 (1979) and Financial Reporting
Release No. 1, Section 605, 5 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 73,306 (1982).
45 Fed. Reg. at 1603.
Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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Equity Funding fraud and first shared that information with his clients.
The court stated:
There is no question that securities industry professionals may
legitimately engage in securities analysis for the benefit of their
clients, and they may accumulate and sell information in order to
make a profit. In the common run of day-to-day business, profes-
sional securities analysis is perhaps the best way to aggregate
and evaluate information in the securities markets; the analysts
thus serve themselves, their clients, and the public interest in ef-
ficient capital markets all at the same time. But it is intrinsic in
our notion of 'business ethics' that at some point we are not con-
tent to let securities analysts' quest for fees and commissions
define their obligations to the public at large. In this case, the
role of analysis-for-hire ceased when its unavoidable result was
to foster the sale of 'unsound, fraudulent, and worthless
securities' to the uninformed public. At the very least, Dirks owed
a duty to report what he had learned to the SEC and not to
foster such sales.100
By extrapolation from this authority, an investment banker may expose
himself to antifraud liabilities by participating in the development of an
Exchange Act filing. '
The question becomes more difficult for the research arms of these
same investment bankers. By becoming involved in issuers' Exchange
Act reporting programs, the research analysts may acquire material in-
formation that would expose them to antifraud liabilities. To avoid possi-
ble liability, the analysts might restrict their research activities so as to
minimize their potential liabilities. But the Commission has recognized
that a following among market professionals serves to assure the opera-
tion of the efficient market. Accordingly, it may be counter-productive to
create a system which tends to dissuade analysts from performing their
market functions by imposing on them potential Exchange Act liabilities
for their participation in the issuer's periodic reporting system.
Additionally, the Commission's antimanipulation rule' 2 may in-
terfere with the operation of an efficient securities market. Among other
things, the rule limits the capacity of a broker-dealer to make in-
ducements to buy, such as the issuance of research recommendations, in
the context of their participation in a new offering. In connection with
its promulgation of the integrated disclosure system, the Commission
announced an interim no-action position permitting the distribution of
any research report up until three days before commencement of sales in
a distribution of securities.' 3 Commentators had noted that a cut-off date
" Id. at 841.
Io, But cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
' Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1981).
,0 Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,398 n. 94 (1982); Securities
Act Release No. 6387, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,482 (1982).
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for inducements to buy far in advance of the commencement of the offer-
ing could interfere with the accurate pricing of the offered securities."4
The Commission should consider eliminating this limitation to assure op-
timal market input from all market professionals whether or not they
are participating in the new offering."5
Finally, as suggested previously, the "fraud-on-the-market" theory
of liability should be refined to restrict its operation to developed
markets as identified by the SEC in its criteria for issuers eligible to use
the abbreviated registration statement on Form S-3."°' These issuers
deal in securities most likely to behave in the manner consistent with
the efficient market theory according to the SEC. Further, the courts
should consider limiting the application of the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory to situations where the misrepresentation necessarily affected
the market price subsequent to affecting the decisions of market profes-
sionals to buy or sell the security. The "reasonable investor" standard,
unlike the "professional investor" standard, does not sufficiently iden-
tify information with such a market impact.
V. CONCLUSION
The recognition of the efficient market theory has significantly
altered the manner in which issuers register and bring securities to the
market. But these alterations require a similar transformation of
securities law liabilities. In the foregoing discussion, we have suggested
only a few areas which require reassessment in view of the principles of
the efficient market theory as adopted by the SEC. Numerous other
areas require reexamination to assure that securities law liabilities are
consistent with the practical mechanics of the securities markets.
14 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,483-84.
105 To avoid a discrete instance of manipulative activity, instead of avoiding a situation
that possibly permits a person to engage in a manipulative activity, the Commission could
rely on the flexible liabilities sustainable in antifraud suits, rather than by general rule.
' Under such a standard it appears likely that neither Panzirer nor Shores would be
eligible for consideration under a "fraud-on-the-market" theory because the issuer in Pan-
zirer appeared to have no wide following in the market (E.F. Hutton did not follow the com-
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